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Introduction
This article argues that shareholder supremacy is based
on a false concept that the shareholders own the company.
It will refute the dominant view in both the academic and
corporate worlds that the shareholders have a property
right over the company. It will argue that the whole
edifice of shareholder supremacy is based on shaky
foundations; property rights do not apply within the
company law context in the samemanner as in other areas
of law. It argues that the recognition of the shareholders
as owners of the company was justified in the context of
the early corporate forms such as partnerships, but that
its transplant into the modern public company is not only
deeply problematic but wrong. The structure, nature and
functions of the modern public company and the role of
shareholders within its context have changed to such a
degree that the previous status of shareholders as owners
of the company is obsolete. The evolution from
partnership to the modern company has resulted in a new
landscape in company law. It is therefore astonishing that
this is not reflected in theory, where shareholders are
dogmatically accepted as the owners of the company. At
least at a theoretical level, they enjoy complete supremacy
at the expense of actors who are vital for the operation
and the success of the corporation, namely the creditors,
the employees, the suppliers and through them, in a way,
society as a whole.
This article will define the traditional notion of property
rights and it will argue that they are not applicable in the
modern corporate context. It will argue that shareholder
ownership nowadays flows mostly from ideological
dogmatism. Presently, in practice, shareholders can only
legitimately use the rights inherent in their shares, such
as the right to vote. However, the existence of shares with
multiple or no voting rights proves that establishing a
link between shareholding and ownership of the company
is a challenging task. Their role in monitoring the
management is nowadays widely recognised as very
difficult to perform. This article will focus on shareholder
protection and, more specifically, on the derivative action
of ss.260–263 of the Companies Act 2006 (CA 2006).
The derivative action was introduced so as to empower
aggrieved shareholders against mismanagement of the
company. However, it will be argued that holding the
management to account will prove to be difficult. If
shareholders were the owners of the company, they would
enjoy a protection similar to that of the owner of any other
tangible or intangible good. This article will argue that
the judicial stance on the matter proves that it is now
increasingly embedded in jurisprudence that the status of
shareholders as owners of the company is more of a
fallacy than a reality. The judiciary has now abandoned
the attachment to property rights when examining the
position of shareholders, especially in relation to
management. The fact that the courts refuse to grant to
shareholders a level of protection suitable to a proprietor
testifies to the deeply problematic nature of shareholder
primacy and the invalidity of the property rights rhetoric
on the corporation.
Can the traditional concepts of
“ownership” and “property rights” apply
in companies?
Property rights are defined as consisting primarily of a
“bundle of rights”.1 The definition of the traditional
concept of ownership and property rights entails the right
of exclusion, the right of use, the right of possession and
the right to alienate.2 This is a characteristic of the
Western liberal property concept, which emphasises the
power to exclude others
“as the central indicia of ownership, and the right of
the owner to the beneficial use and enjoyment of the
land and personal property over which ownership
is claimed”.3
The owner of property has the right to exclude other
individuals from his property, to refuse the use of his
property for unauthorised purposes and to refuse its
possession by others. If any individual attempts to disobey
these restrictions, they may be found accused of criminal
conduct such as theft or of a civil offence such as
trespassing. Owners traditionally have “an unassailable
legal entitlement to immediate possession of property
occupied by ab initio trespassers”,4 which the
1 P. Birks, “The Concept of Civil Wrong” in D.G. Owen (ed.), Philosophical Foundations of Tort Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), p.48.
2N.S. Glackin, “Back to Bundles: Deflating Property Rights, Again” (2014) 29(1) Legal Theory 3.
3C. Rodgers, “Nature’s Place? Property Rights, Property Rules and Environmental Stewardship” (2009) 68(3) Cambridge Law Journal 553.
4R. Walsh, “Stability and Predictability in English Property Law: The Impact of Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights Reassessed” (2015) 131 Law
Quarterly Review 586.
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circumstances and needs of the trespassers could not
displace or postpone. Thus, an element of power rests at
the very core of the traditional notion of ownership: the
power to determine the relationship between the property
itself and third parties. Therefore, a distinctive
characteristic of
“a property relationship between one person and a
thing, at any point along the property spectrum, is
to negate the liberty of the rest of mankind to use
the thing without the licence of the ‘owner’.”5
Property law is “replete with legal doctrines that specify
control powers rather than liability rules”.6 The concept
of property as an expression of power follows inexorably
from the understanding of property rights not as rights
over things but as rights against persons. In Southwark,7
the court ruled that necessity in the form of a deprived
homeless family moving into an empty council house at
a time of an extreme housing crisis without permission
is a “mask for anarchy… squatters committed a criminal
offence in forcibly entering into property, as well as the
civil offence of trespass”.8 In addition to that, property
owners are free to use and dispose of their property as
they see fit.9 Nothing can curb the power of the owner to
allow access to any unauthorised individual.
In sharp contrast to that, in the corporate context,
shareholders will find that they do not possess this power.
Not only do they lack the right or the capacity to allow
or prevent access to the company’s premises but, more
importantly, they will find it quite difficult even to protect
their investment from mismanagement. If ownership is
understood as governing power relationships between the
different actors who are related to the property, it is even
more important in a company context to look at the
management who have the real power to deploy the assets
of the company. Corporate governance reflects these
arrangements at corporate level and assigns these powers
not to shareholders but to management. Many
shareholders—especially the minority ones—do not even
get a say on the choice of the managers of the company.
This is due to either lack of information or even to a lack
of interest in corporate affairs. The latter is a clear
indication that many shareholders do not view themselves
as owners of the company in the first place. Even at a
psychological level, the owner of an item is interested in
determining its use; this does not appear to be the case
with shareholders, who are content to confine themselves
to the modest role of getting some profit from the
company in the form of dividends rather than exercising
any ownership-like right or carrying out the
responsibilities inherent in such a role, such as keeping
themselves informed about corporate developments at all
times.
Therefore, companies do not fit into the property rights
discourse.10 In contrast to the traditional legal theory of
property rights, the shareholders are not in a position to
exercise the traditional rights inherent in the concept of
property; no shareholder is permitted to “use a listed
company’s assets for his own purpose or restrict
management’s access to corporate resources”.11 Thus, in
Automatic Self Cleansing Filter Syndicate,12 the court
held that a resolution passed by a simple majority of
shareholders was not effective. The resolution purported
to order the directors to go ahead with an agreement to
sell the whole of the assets of the company. The directors
believed that this was unwise. The court clarified that the
“control of the company is to be vested in the directors”.13
The corporate concept therefore clearly slices the bundle
of rights inherent in property rights into various pieces:
the stockholder
“gets the right to receive some of the fruits of the
use of property, a fractional residual right in
corporate property, and a very limited right of
control. The rights to possess, use, and control the
property go to the managers of the corporation”.14
According to the court, “a sole shareholder has no
independent right which is violated by trespass upon or
conversion of the corporation’s property”15; this
demonstrates the difficulty in using traditional notions of
property in the corporate context.
To that end, in Foss,16 the court stated that
“it was not, nor could it successfully be, argued that
it was a matter of course for any individual members
of a corporation thus to assume to themselves the
right of suing [the management] in the name of the
corporation. In law the corporation and the aggregate
members of the corporation are not the same thing
for purposes like this”.
This ruling forms, notably, one of the foundations of the
English company law as it has clearly formulated one of
its basic rules. It underlines not only the nature of the
company as the only bearer of the right to sue the directors
for mismanagement, but it also highlights, in a rather
vivid manner, the particularly disadvantageous position,
5 J.W. Harris, Property and Justice (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996), p.264.
6L.M. Austin, “Property and the Rule of Law” (2014) 20(2) Legal Theory 88.
7 Southwark LBC v Williams [1971] Ch. 734; [1971] 2 W.L.R. 467; 69 L.G.R. 145 CA (Civ Div).
8 See Southwark [1971] Ch. 734; andMcPhail v Persons, Names Unknown [1973] Ch. 447 at 460; [1973] 3 W.L.R. 71; 72 L.G.R. 93 CA (Civ Div).
9T. Allen, “Liberalism, Social Democracy and the Value of Property under the European Convention on Human Rights” (2010) 59(4) International and Comparative Law
Quarterly 1055, 1056.
10P. Ireland, “Company Law and theMyth of Shareholder Ownership” (1999) 62M.L.R. 62. See also J. Hill, “Visions and Revisions of the Shareholder” (2000) 48 American
Journal of Comparative Law 39.
11C. Rose, “Stakeholder Orientation versus Shareholder Value: A Matter of Contractual Failures” (2004) 18 European Journal of Law and Economics 77, 82.
12Automatic Self Cleansing Filter Syndicate Co Ltd v Cuninghame [1906] 2 Ch. 34 CA.
13Automatic Self Cleansing Filter Syndicate [1906] 2 Ch. 34.
14D. Votaw, Modern Corporations (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1965) quoted in M.M. Blair, Ownership and Control (Washington, D.C.: Brooking Institute, 1995),
p.224.
15W. Clay Jackson Enterprises Inc v Greyhound Leasing and Financial Corp 463 F. Supp. 666, 670 (D.P.R. 1979).
16Foss v Harbottle 67 E.R. 189; (1843) 2 Hare 461 Ch.
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especially of minority shareholders who are literally stuck
in the company without a particularly effective means to
react to mismanagement and the loss of their investment
and capital. Minority shareholders are thought to be
motivated to be “rationally ignorant in the sense that their
ownership stake does not afford them much influence
with management”.17 Their lack of influence on corporate
decision-making encourages their lack of engagement
within corporate affairs, which facilitates their lack of
information about the corporate agenda. Therefore, they
are trapped in a company with a set of dire choices in
their hands. They can either sell their shares at a severe
loss—and therefore fail to retrieve even their initial
investment—or stay in a company where their influence
is indeed minimal, if any. Their disadvantageous position
within the company, which is explained in detail in the
final part of this article, basically leaves them with a
theoretical entitlement of ownership without the capacity
to control themanagement and safeguard their investment.
In this case, minority shareholders will see their actual
property—their shares and capital—suffer heavy losses,
and yet, they will be in no position to react to a violation
which in property law would have been sanctioned. This
is a clear indicator of the difficulty in using “property
rights” rhetoric in the company law context. Their “de
jure ownership claim of an equity capital share is
‘autonomous’, completely separated from the de facto
operational control” of the company.18 The theoretical
façade of the relationship between the shareholders and
the company is one marked by the existence of a property
right on the company; however, in practice, the
shareholders—especially the minority ones—are left
without the means to effectively safeguard their
investment.
In addition to that, the right of possession which is
integral to the notion of property rights is inapplicable in
the case of shareholders. They can only validly claim that
they have a right to possess their shares but the company
is legally recognised as being a person separate from the
humans behind it. It has a lifespan of its own and it
determines its own affairs. Themanagers of the company
are under a legal duty to promote the success of the
company, even when that comes into conflict with the
interests of parts of its shareholders. The shareholders are
legally allowed to pursue their own interests even when
the latter do not coincide with the interests of the
company.19 In fact they are even allowed to become
parties to shareholders’ agreements which bind them into
voting en bloc in general meetings aimed at pursuing the
distinctive individual interests of the parties to the
agreement rather than the interests of the company as a
whole.20 Therefore, it is judicially accepted that the
interests of the company and the interests of the
shareholders may indeed diverge; and, if so, the directors
are legally obliged to pursue the interests of the company
to the detriment of the interests of—at least—parts of the
shareholding. These are distinctive features of company
law that cannot be traced in the traditional relationship
of ownership, where owner and property are integrally
linked and the latter is used with the exclusive aim of
serving the needs and interests of its owner.
Even the possession of their shares does not entail a
traditional ownership-like relationship. Section 541 of
the CA 2006 states that “the shares or other interest of a
member in a company are personal property … and are
not in the nature of real estate”. It is therefore recognised
that a share does not confer on its owner a right to the
“physical possession of anything”.21 It is nowadays
judicially accepted that a share confers a right22—albeit
with limitations—to invoke the provisions of the articles
of association. Furthermore, the existence of shares with
no voting rights, as well as the existence of
non-transferable shares, challenges the very core of the
traditional right to property which, as explained above,
is founded upon the rights to use and alienate. The
shareholder may be lacking any influence on important
aspects of the decision-making of the company if he owns
shares that do not grant any right to vote and, therefore,
no right to have a say in the corporate context. Similarly,
he may possess non-transferable shares that entail the
loss of yet another aspect of traditional property rights:
the right to alienate.
Within the context of the traditional concept of
ownership, the owner could enjoy judicially enforced
property insurance. The latter provides financial
reimbursement to the owner of property in the event of
damage or theft. One cannot detect any analogy to that
in the corporate context. The only potential analogy could
be the remedies available to shareholders in cases of
directorial abuse which may lead to damage and financial
losses for shareholders. However, as it is thoroughly
explained in the final part of this article, the judicial stance
on this matter is at best ambivalent. The courts refrain
from interfering with the internal affairs of the company
and the shareholders face a set of obstacles in their
attempt to invoke the remedies in question. In any case,
as the analysis of ss.260–263 of the CA 2006 in the final
part of this article demonstrates, even when they are
successful in their bid to address directorial
mismanagement, any compensation is not granted to them
but to the legal person that is the company. This is a clear
judicial recognition of the lack of any ownership right on
the part of shareholders. When a tenant causes damage
to the property of the owner, the latter is granted
compensation to cover the costs of repair. He/she can
even demand a guarantee when renting his property to
17K. Sikavica and A.J. Hillman, “Combining Financial and Psychological Insights for a New Typology of Ownership” in M. Goranova and L.V. Ryan (eds), Shareholder
Empowerment (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015), p.44.
18G. Poitras, Equity Capital: From Ancient Partnerships to Exchange Traded Funds (New York: Routledge, 2016), p.447.
19Fulham Football Club Ltd v Cabra Estates Plc [1992] B.C.C. 863; [1994] 1 B.C.L.C 363; (1993) 65 P. & C.R. 284 CA (Civ Div).
20Fulham Football Club [1992] B.C.C. 863.
21 See J. Dine and M. Koutsias, Company Law (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014), p.67.
22Eley v Positive Government Security Life Assurance Co Ltd (1876) 1 Ex. D. 88 CA.
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the tenant. In the corporate context, the shareholders may
not get to choose who will manage the company; and if
management is deeply ineffective, leading to serious
losses and financial damage, the shareholders may
succeed in getting some compensation which, however,
is not granted to them but to the legal person. Section 260
of the CA 2006 is absolutely clear in stating that the
shareholders are enforcing a right which does not belong
to them but to the company and, therefore, they cannot
have a legal claim on the relevant compensation. Their
main benefit is that theymay now be in a companywhich
is managed in a more effective manner. This is clearly a
status which has nothing in common with the owner of
property in its mainstream sense.
In the most extreme scenario of expropriation, where
the owner is deprived of his property for a superior public
good, a liberal legal order will involve the compensation
of the owner at a level comparable to the market value
of his property, aiming at leaving the owner no worse off
than he would have been under “an ordinary consensual
transaction with other private parties”.23 On the other
hand, in a social democratic legal order, “economic
efficiency is furthered by denying compensation to
property owners who are able to self-insure against the
risk of expropriation”.24 Compensation is not viewed as
restitution to the prior condition but as one of the
parameters of the general management of the economy.
If one attempts a parallel to the company, one may argue
that, in the case of insolvency, which entails the total loss
of shareholder investment and the coming to an end of
the company, depriving the shareholders of their
property—that being their shares and capital invested in
the company—the shareholders do not enjoy such
protection. At this critical point where the company ceases
to exist, the state treats creditors as the owners of the
company, placing them at the top of the list of actors who
are to be compensated for the demise of the company.
Property law sees the relationship between “owners of
private property and the state as one of opposition. Their
interests must be “balanced against each other”25 and that
balance can only be struck if the owner receives market
value compensation for being deprived of his property.
This is certainly not the case in the corporate context.
One of the most distinctive features of insolvency is
that there is a list of actors who should be satisfied at the
end of the process in priority from others. A preferential
creditor is a creditor receiving a preferential right to
payment upon the debtor’s insolvency. That means that
certain creditors are given priority over others, usually
for the whole amount of their claims but potentially also
for a certain value of their claims against the company.
In the UK, creditors with fixed security are prioritised
over the preferential creditors generally. The preferences
list will be drafted on the basis of the existence of fixed
and floating charges. The shareholders are at the bottom
of the list and they are compensated only if the demands
of all other actors are satisfied. It seems that, in the
corporate context, the risk inherent in the role of
shareholders, which is often combined with lax
supervision of the management of the company, is much
higher than the risk assumed by the owner of property in
its traditional sense.
Therefore, when the core of the traditional concept of
property is unenforceable within the company law
context, it is evident that the employment of property
rights rhetoric is based solely on ideological grounds
rather than any solid legal basis. It is a remnant of early
corporate forms where the relationship between the
company and its shareholders was recognised as one
marked by the existence of property rights. However, that
relationship presented characteristics that do not survive
nowadays. Furthermore, while the corporate realities
underpinning the notion of ownership within the company
changed radically, theory still interprets the concept of
property rights within the corporate context in a deeply
flawed manner.
The historical and ideological roots of
shareholder primacy—property, liberty
and individual rights
The roots of the English corporate model were chiefly
inspired by the legal thinking of medieval England.
England was an agricultural society:
“[T]rades ancillary to agriculture and village life
were practised locally by individual traders and their
families. The bulk of medieval trade and industry
was professionalized and largely confined to
communal towns.”26
In the 12th and 13th centuries, the development of the
Flemish commercial society led to the export of English
wool and the growth of foreign trade across the shores.27
In the commercial towns, both the manufacturers and the
merchants “traded under the aegis of the craft guilds”.28
Guilds were organisations that controlled the local market,
which operated as a monopoly. The guilds would set the
regulatory requirements to enter themarket, the conditions
that local craftsmen had to fulfil or the standards for the
production of local goods. This is important, as one can
detect the roots of one of the most fundamental aspects
of English company law at that exact point. The country’s
tendency to self-regulate and avoid state legislative
intervention was evident in the organisation of the guilds.
When guilds were at the peak of their power, the
23Allen, “Liberalism, Social Democracy and the Value of Property under the European Convention on Human Rights” (2010) 59(4) International and Comparative Law
Quarterly 1055, 1056.
24L. Blume and D. Rubinfeld, “Compensation for Takings: An Economic Analysis” (1984) 72 California Law Review 569.
25Allen, “Liberalism, Social Democracy and the Value of Property under the European Convention on Human Rights (2010) 59(4) International and Comparative Law
Quarterly 1055, 1057.
26M.M. Postan, The Medieval Economy and Society (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1972; London: Pelican, 1975).
27R.I. Tricker, Corporate Governance: Practices, Procedures and Powers in British Companies and their Boards of Directors (Aldershot: Gower, 1984), p.26.
28Tricker, Corporate Governance (1984), p.26.
The Fallacy of Property Rights’ Rhetoric in the Company Law Context 219
[2017] I.C.C.L.R., Issue 6 © 2017 Thomson Reuters (Professional) UK Limited and Contributors
restrictive illiberal regulation did not flow from the state
but from the guilds themselves. Their regulations
perpetuated the existence of monopolies at that time,
betraying yet another expression of individualism that
seeks to limit the role of the state in what are perceived
as personal affairs. Personal freedom became “universal”
at an early date in this country as “self help and self
government” were for centuries taught to the English in
the “school of town life … there were no rights without
duties”.29 Therefore, when Jefferson wrote that
“we hold those truths to be sacred and undeniable:
that all men are created equal and independent, that
from that equal creation they demand rights inherent
and inalienable”,
he was putting into words a view of the individual and
society which had its roots in 13th-century England or
earlier.30 Individuality and self-regulation enjoy deep roots
in English history, having left their clear imprint on all
aspects of regulation. Company law could not be an
exception to that rule, nor could corporate governance.
Every nation constructs the structure of its companies in
a manner reflective of its dominant ideological principles
and beliefs. It was only natural that English companies
would be based on the very same principles that shaped
the predominant ideological identity of the nation.
The common law became strongly associated with the
idea of economic freedom and, more generally, the
subject’s liberty from arbitrary action by the Crown.31
The philosophical foundations of such a debate can be
traced before that. Magna Carta, a landmark development
in the evolution of English constitutional law and
traditions, included a variety of rights with a special
emphasis evidently attributed to the rights of the
individual. The inclusion of the right to property in the
list of fundamental rights, and the importance ascribed
to personal ownership as an expression of liberty,
provided England with the theoretical basis on which its
future corporate law was to be determinately influenced.
Therefore, English law was keen from an early stage to
protect aspects of the private life of individuals against
intrusions from everyone, including the king, and has a
rich tradition32 in the protection of personal autonomy.
As early as 1604, in Semayne’s Case, it was stated that
“the house of everyone is to him as his castle and
fortress”.33
Magna Carta placed “individual liberties above all
others except communal rights”,34 a concept adopted by
English common law in the 13th century. In 1361, the
English Justices of the Peace Act 1361 provided for the
arrest of peeping toms and eavesdroppers. From the
beginning, the intent to protect an individual from the
Government was clear:
“[T]he poorest man may in his cottage bid defiance
to all force of the Crown. It may be frail … the rain
may enter; but the King of England cannot enter.”35
This position vividly highlights the prominent position
that liberty assumed in the English legal order from a
very early point of history. It is translated into the right
of any individual to define a space that should be
respected by anyone, including the highest authority. The
underlining concept of liberty was the right to personal
property. The phrase “an Englishman’s home is his castle”
embodies the profoundness of the right in question in the
nation’s mind; the home is the castle of its owner and no
one can enter unless permitted by the owner. Liberty is
a sacrosanct right which allows an individual to exercise
his activities, without any intervention, within a space
where he can exercise his authority.
Therefore, the links between the right to property and
liberty in the sense of safeguarding a place against
intrusion from any authority highlight the importance of
the former within the English legal culture. The “house
of everyone” was defined as a fully autonomous area
which should be left intact from external intervention,
even by as superior an authority as the king. This is very
similar to the dominant perception of the company in the
UK today. The company is an exclusively private affair
which should be left intact by governmental or judicial
intervention unless the latter is indeed imperative. The
main problem emerges when actors who do not have any
ownership claim on the company, such as the
management, and administer the company in such a way
that strips the shareholders of any rights that resemble
the rights of ownership. The right to control the company
is the principal right of this type. Nowadays, it seems that
someone has invaded the “house”, assumed more power
than its owner or legal resident and stripped the latter of
the protection that he/she was supposed to enjoy.
Therefore, shareholders are left with an entitlement to
ownership of the company in law but, in fact, with just a
few tools against the invasion by foreign actors—the
management—of what used to be considered as their
autonomous space. The state and the judiciary remain
faithful to their adherence to a hands-off approach to the
corporate phenomenon. They avoid interfering in
corporate affairs even in cases where shareholders’ rights
are at risk. While the English legal order offers a solid
protection of ownership rights across all fields of law,
the approach taken within the context of company law is
a notable departure from that principle. Also, it reveals a
29G.M. Trevelyan, English Social History (London; Penguin, 1944).
30A. Macfarlane, The Origins of English Individualism (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1978), p.202.
31 P.G. Mahoney, “The Common Law and Economic Growth: Hayek Might Be Right” (2001) 30 Journal of Legal Studies 508.
32 See Lord G. Slynn, “The Development of Human Rights in the United Kingdom” (2005) 28 Fordham International Law Journal 477.
33 Semayne’s Case 77 E.R. 194 at [91a] No.1; (1604) 5 Co. Rep. 91 QB. See R. Singh, “Privacy and the Media after the Human Rights Act” (1998) 6 European Human
Rights Law Review 712.
34B.R. Bale, “Informed Lending Decision v Privacy Interests in Great Britain” (1997) 10 Transnational Lawyer 77.
35B.L. Cardonsky, “Towards a Meaningful Right to Privacy in the United Kingdom” (2002) 20 Boston University International Law Journal 396.
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judicial departure from the principle that the shareholders
are the owners of the company, a principle whose
dominance in theory is almost absolute.
Therefore, there is a fundamental understanding of
individual liberty as inextricably linked with ownership
of property. This is the ideological context which defined
company law too. The status enjoyed by personal liberty
and property in the English legal order distinguished the
country from its continental European neighbours and
led historians to claim that “England in the thirteenth
century was a far more sophisticated market than Marx
recognised”.36 In the corporate governance context,
“ownership” entails the legal allocation of property rights
among stakeholders such as shareholders, creditors and
employees, and “controls” the ways legal rules shape the
balance of power among them.37 Therefore, there is a clear
conflict of the essence of property rights between UK and
continental European thought on the matter. This is
despite that fact that the early teachings of the Christian
Church were hostile to individual ownership of property;
these teachings against ownership failed to assume
prominence in the West, where a cultural trend traced
back to Aristotle viewed ownership of property as the
basis of a durable society.38
In the UK, the understanding of property rights is very
much related to the allocation of risk within the context
of a commercial relationship as well as within the
corporate context.39 This is particularly evident in
commercial as well as contractual relationships, where
the question of how risk is allocated relates to the question
of which market participant bears the risk of market
transactions.Whilst a contractual agreement between two
parties appears to be neutral at first sight, the truth is that
the disparity of bargaining power between the individuals
involved will fall more heavily on the weakest party to
the transaction. While the state has put in place a
procedure on the basis of which a breach of contractual
obligations is to be sanctioned, in reality, the weakest
party does not have equal access to that procedure with
its strongest contractual party.
A good example of that is the company in the UK. The
latter is viewed as a contractual entity—a nexus of
contract—which is built upon the articles of association.
The articles are the company’s constitution and they are
viewed as a contract. Parties to the contract are the
company as well as every shareholder who joins the
company. It is argued in this article that the contract is
not of neutral value; despite the existence of enforcement
mechanisms provided by law, its implementation by the
weakest contractual party—the shareholders—is indeed
quite difficult. Therefore, there is a great divergence
between the reality and the rhetoric where the
shareholders are recognised as the owners of the company
and their supremacy is theoretically unchallenged. In
practice, they are a weak party to a contract; they fail to
enforce rights stemming from that contract because their
access to the state enforcement procedure is problematic.
Therefore, the property rights rhetoric in the context of
company law leads to very uncomfortable conclusions.
The shareholders are the owners of the company while
enjoying an eroded protection of the rights which flow
from their shares. Stakeholders who have no property
rights claim on the corporation are exorcised as mere
externalities when they are crucial for corporate success,
especially in the long term. That paves the way only to
directorial primacy which negates the whole property
rights rhetoric as it places the individuals with no property
right claim whatsoever at the corporate throne. As Berle
puts it, “the peculiarity of the corporate form is that it
subjects … property rights [of the shareholders] to such
exigencies in a peculiar and drastic degree and for far
more limited ends”.40
The property right of the company is vested in the legal
person that is the company. The latter has assumed
ownership of both its business activities and its property.
That means using the corporate vehicle exclusively for
the purposes of private profit devoid of any social
responsibility; the latter is likely to contravene the
property rights of the company. That is not to suggest
that the company should not aim at profitability.
Profitability should be achieved in a sustainable manner
based on long-term planning that would serve all
stakeholders involved and, principally, the shareholders.
In reality, property rights are normally accompanied by
a responsibility of the owner to fulfil certain standards,
i.e. the owner of the flat has to sustain it at an acceptable
level for tenants. In company law, it seems that property
rights are granted theoretically at least to the shareholders
with no responsibilities attached. In addition to that, the
management of the company can abuse the provisions of
the contract—the articles of association—but the other
party to the transaction can find it very hard to sanction
the abuse.
Therefore, it seems that, within company law, we have
the introduction of a set of property rights which operate
on a very different basis from those in the outside world,41
and this is the result of an ideological dogma which fails
to admit that this rhetoric has evolved into the source of
major problems within the company. The ideological
underpinnings of property rights in the corporate context
result in a clearly distortive allocation of risk to the part
of stakeholders—including the shareholders—and
therefore end up by allocating the actual power to
management. Property rights are defined as “rights against
other people”42 and they were aimed at being exercised
by shareholders against anyone who infringes them.
36Macfarlane, The Origins of English Individualism (1978), p.201.
37 S. Wen, Shareholder Primacy and Corporate Governance (Abingdon: Routledge, 2013), p.13.
38R.A.G. Monks and N. Minow, Corporate Governance (Chichester: John Wiley and Sons Ltd, 2010), p.96.
39 J. Dine, M. Koutsias and M. Blecher, Company Law in the New Europe (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2007), p.118.
40A. Berle and G. Means, The Modern Corporation and Private Property, Library of Congress (New Jersey: Transaction Publishers, 1991), p.245.
41Harris, Property and Justice (2002), p.140.
42Dine, Koutsias and Blecher, Company Law in the New Europe (2007), p.118.
The Fallacy of Property Rights’ Rhetoric in the Company Law Context 221
[2017] I.C.C.L.R., Issue 6 © 2017 Thomson Reuters (Professional) UK Limited and Contributors
However, now they are in fact exercised by the company
through itsmanagement against all stakeholders, including
the shareholders. This is a serious failure of the dominant
theory of property rights within the context of company
law and, unless it is radically reformed, the problems to
which it gave birth are not going to be dealt with
effectively.
The birth of shareholder primacy and
ownership in company
law—partnerships
The notion of ownership that is dominant in the English
company law today stems from partnership. This article
argues that the recognition of shareholders as owners of
the partnership was justified on the basis of the nature of
risk they assumed when becoming partners. However,
the emergence of the limited liability public company has
introduced a considerable shift in the relationship between
the shareholders on the one hand and the company on the
other, which renders necessary a reconsideration and a
redefinition of the term “ownership”. Defining ownership
within the context of the modern corporate forms in the
same manner as with partnerships is not only obsolete
but, most importantly, wrong as it fails to take into
account a set of factors that have significantly altered the
nature of the shareholders’ relationship with the company.
By the early 18th century, small partnerships were the
preferred tool to conduct business and trade in England.
These companies were not incorporated, and a mere
collection of individuals constituted and owned the
entity.43 The owners of the partnerships were also
providing the funding for the enterprise. Rapid
technological developments necessitated increased
funding for the expansion of the existing enterprises if
they were to embrace novel methods of production. These
developments led to the unincorporated company, a form
of partnership where some members would run the
company and others, usually landowners or successful
traders, would provide the capital. The partnerships were
marked by absolute shareholder primacy; the shareholders
were the “owners” of the entity.While that sounds similar
to the dominant approach nowadays too, the premise on
which shareholder primacy was based was very different
from the contemporary corporate reality. At that point,
shareholder primacy was reflected at all levels of
corporate activities and shareholders clearly enjoyed
rights which were normally attributed to the owners of
an object, in complete contrast to now. At that point, every
shareholder could block collective decisions. Partnerships
reached decisions through the unanimity rule based on
the one partner, one vote system.44 This is a point of
crucial importance as it serves as a clear demonstration
of the fact that the early partners were heavily involved
in the administration and themanagement of the company.
They formed an integral part of the management and they
exercised full control of the company. Their ownership
was a notion of control of what was supposedly owned.
These links have now been smashed, rendering imperative
a redefinition of the supposed “property right” that
shareholders hold on the company.
The members’ involvement in the company was
underlined by the one partner, one vote system, which
rendered each member of the company instrumental in
its decision-making. This has to be contrasted with
shareholders now; they can hold shares which may or
may not have voting rights attached to them. If the
shareholder is the owner of the company, then why are
there non-voting shares? How can the institutionalisation
of the lack of control on the company on the part of the
supposed “owner” be justified? It is astonishing that the
dominant trend within company law views a shareholder
as an owner of the companywhen hemay have no control
over the management of the company, especially when
his share may carry either no voting rights, which renders
the application of the principle of “ownership” a mere
farce, or a single voting right, which weighs more lightly
than the respective shares of other members that may
carry multiple voting rights. This is not only problematic
for the application of the concepts of “ownership” and
“property rights” to shareholders, but it betrays a state of
affairs that is redolent of a lack of democratic
accountability within modern companies. Therefore, it is
clearly argued that, since the nature of the relationship of
shareholders with the company has changed so much, it
is surprising that the law has avoided recognising this
reality and still recognises a form of shareholder
dominance within the company that, in reality, is
gradually resembling an empty shell. The case of the
derivative action analysed at a later point in this article
is indicative of the contrast between dominant ideology
as reflected by the law and contemporary corporate
reality.
In the case of insolvency, all members of the
partnership were liable for the accumulated debt;
therefore, the level of risk assumed by shareholders at
that point was indeed paramount. The fortunes and fate
of the company coincided with their personal fortune and
fate. In 1854, the Royal Commission on the reform of
mercantile law stated that:
“[T]he law of partnership which renders every
person who … [is] liable to the whole of the debts
is unsatisfactory and should be amended to permit
such persons to contribute to the capital of such
concerns … without incurring liability beyond a
limited amount.”45
The Limited Liability Act 1855 was passed, granting, for
the first time, the privilege of limited liability to the
members of joint stock companies that comprised more
43 F.B. Palmer, Company Law (London: Sweet and Maxwell, 1968), p.134.
44A. Rahmani, “Shareholder Control and its Nemesis” [2012] I.C.C.L.R. 13.
45Royal Commission on the Reform of Mercantile Law, Report (1854).
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than 25 members; the companies assumed the
responsibility to include the word “limited” in their name
but this principle was denied to general partners.46
The evolution of shareholder primacy
and ownership—the joint stock
companies
The introduction of the notion of the corporate entity in
the UK’s Joint Stock Companies Act 1844 saw “the entity
displace the shareholders as owner of the enterprise”.47
The companies were made separate from their
shareholders. Parliament then passed the Joint Stock
Companies Act in 1856 (JSCA 1856), which formed a
consolidating statute. The divorce between the corporation
and the human element behind it was not fully absorbed,
and s.3 of the JSCA 1856 read “seven or more persons
… may … form themselves into an incorporated
company”.48 This suggested that the company and its
founders were inseparable. The newCompanies Act 1862
(CA 1862) deleted the words “themselves into”; at that
point it was clear that private individuals could no longer
assume the corporate form.49 It was clear that a company
consisted of them but it was certainly not them.50 This
statement embodies the essence of one of the fundamental
principles of company law, which recognises the company
as a separate legal person. Even in pure linguistic terms,
today, a company is referred to as “it”, reflecting precisely
its depersonalised status, while before the CA 1862,
companies were referred to as “they”, indicating their
unbreakable links with the humans who comprised them.51
From that point, the “company was everything that the
shareholders did not own”.52 It was its assets, human,
tangible and tangible, contracts and agreements.
Therefore, the companywas basically what was left from
the legal divorce between the productive assets of the
company and the private individuals who initially founded
it.
The Vice-President of the Board of Trade53 would
explain that
“it is not as important to urge the adoption of limited
liability… (but to) argue in favour of human liberty
that people may be permitted to deal how and with
whom they choose without the officious interference
of the state… it is ill advised legislation which steps
in between him and the exercise of that right”.54
This statement, made at the passing of the Bill, reveals
the parameters of its philosophical and ideological
background that also formed the theoretical basis upon
which modern English company law is founded. The
granting of the privilege of limited liability to the
company by the state, in practice, minimised the risk
taken by potential shareholders. It provided solid
safeguards to the latter that the extent of their involvement
in a given company was a purely personal decision. The
granting of limited liability was founded on the basis of
the respect of personal liberty. English company law
would be based on two pillars: on personal liberty and
on the limitation of the role of the state. Joint stock
companies were instituted through a concession by the
king to his subjects,55 rather than the corporation being a
“contractually, voluntarily devised aggregate person”.56
The recognition of the shareholders as the owners of the
company was viewed as a step towards limiting the role
of the state and consolidating personal liberty.
However, the joint stock company did not enjoy a
separate personality from its “members” as, legally
speaking, it was nothing more than a large partnership.57
The members as partners clearly owned the assets, and
they were jointly liable for the debts incurred by the
business and had all the rights and powers which
ownership implied. Their entitlement to control was a
byproduct of their established legal ownership of the
company.58 Therefore, the affairs of the company would
be conducted on the basis of one vote for every
shareholder, irrespective of the size of their investment,
while collective decisions had to be taken unanimously.59
These provisions were a clear indication of the fact that
at that point shareholders were viewed as the members
who co-owned the company and exercised powers which
were consistent with this status, such as continuous
participation in the management of the company and
unanimous approval of its plans. This practice aimed at
safeguarding individual shareholders as members of a
corporation “rather than as owners of a portion of the
corporate capital”.60Nowadays, however, the shareholders
are the owners of the capital reflected by the value of
their shares rather than of the assets of the company.
Therefore, it is clear that joint stock holders of that time
were the owners of the stock comprised in the company.61
46 Partnership Act 1890 s.9.
47A. Keay, Board Accountability in Corporate Governance (Abingdon: Routledge, 2015), p.113.
48 P. Ireland, I. Grigg-Spall and D. Kelly, “The Conceptual Foundations of Modern Company Law” (1987) 14 Journal of Law and Society 149, 150.
49Keay, Board Accountability in Corporate Governance (2015), p.114.
50 Ireland, Grigg-Spall and Kelly, “The Conceptual Foundations of Modern Company Law” (1987) 14 Journal of Law and Society 149, 150.
51Keay, Board Accountability in Corporate Governance (2015), p.114.
52L. Talbot, Critical Company Law (Abingdon: Routledge, 2008), p.154.
53Hansard, HC Vol.140, col.131 (1 February 1856).
54Hansard, HC Vol.140, col.131 (1 February 1856).
55 S. Watson, “The Significance of the Source of the Powers of Boards of Directors in UK Company Law” [2011] J.B.L. 600.
56R. Harris, Industrialising English Law: Entrepreneurship and Business Organisation 1720–1844 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), p.18.
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59Rahmani, “Shareholder Control and its Nemesis” [2012] I.C.C.L.R. 13.
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Clearly, at that point, the principal corporate aim was to
generate profits for their stockholders: the notion of
shareholder primacy.62
As a starting point, company law conceived of
shareholders as the owners of the company, although
nowadays they do not own “the properties” of the
company.63 The early English companies were run by
their owners and those owners were also their controllers.
Ownership and control in these corporations were merged
into a common concept.64 A limited number of partners
acted as a board of directors to manage the business,
subject to the tight control of all the partners in general
meeting.65 The control of the company was integral to the
shareholders’ rights and duties, rendering a claim that
they “owned the company” as absolutely valid. They
exercised the management of the company and assumed
the risks involved in that management. They performed
the duties that an owner performs and they controlled
what they owned. Therefore, at that point, “owners
managed and managers owned”.66 Companies were
regarded as something more than limited partnerships
with each member exercising control over the
management.67 In the York case, the court stated that
directors were to exercise their “judgement as they may
consider best for the interest of the company; that is, for
the interest of the shareholders of the company”.68
Therefore, it is clear that when shareholders were in
control of the company, the courts viewed the two
concepts—company and shareholder—as synonymous.
The owners of the company were the company. In
complete contrast to that, it is nowadays accepted that
directors owe their duty to the company and only to it.
The granting of a separate legal personality to the
company radically altered the nature of the role of
shareholders within the company.69 The owner of the
company is now the company itself.
The modern company—the separation
of ownership and control
The separation of ownership and control was the landmark
event which radically altered the position of shareholders
within the company. It significantly limited their capacity
to exercise control on the company. The separation of
ownership and control came as a result of the increasing
need for capital on the part of American and English
companies in order finance their investments in the newly
invented technologies of that time. They resorted to the
stock market and invited millions of people to buy their
shares and provide them with the capital they were in
need of. Therefore, the companies in those jurisdictions
gradually acquired a dispersed shareholding basis that
comprised potentially millions of shareholders. Also,
while the shareholders were still viewed by law as the
owners and controllers of the company, their number did
not allow them either to control the company or to
participate in its decision-making. This phenomenon
emerged in the US but it applies to English companies
too, which also resort to the stock market to attract capital
for their investments. This is why both systems are
defined as the “outsider systems of corporate
governance”, in contrast to the “insider systems of
corporate governance”. The former—as in the US and
the UK—seek their financing from “outside” the
company, namely the stock markets, while the latter—as
in Germany—seek financing from the “inside” of the
company, namely the existing shareholders, or by banks
in the form of a loan.
Both the English but also the American companies
were on a course of change from the family-run
businesses of the past to the large public companies with
a widely diffused shareholder basis of the present.
Questions in relation to the balance of power within the
corporation were brought from the background to the
centre of the relevant debates that are ongoing up to this
day. David Halberstam argued that, at that point, ordinary
citizens believed that buying stock—owning part of a
giant company—was a real possibility in their lives. By
purchasing stocks, they became
“participants in capitalism … junior partners of
Henry Ford II … the Ford family had been joined
by some 300,000 new co-owners of their company
… It also marked the beginning of a historic shift in
American capitalism, a major increase in the
influence ofWall Street in companies like Ford. The
Street was a partner now and the family had to
respond to its norms… Before the war only a small
number of Americans held stocks and they were to
a large degree of the same class as the owners of the
old line companies. The market was a kind of
gentlemen’s club, virtually off limits to the rest of
the society”.70
A new era emerged, centred on the Stock Exchange and
aimed at making every citizen a stockholder.71 Politics
appeared to play a significant role, which triggered the
further dispersion of shares to a wider number of actors,
further consolidating a model of dispersed shareholders’
basis. According to Roe, the reason for the development
and maintenance of fragmented ownership in the USwas
that politicians did not feel comfortable with Wall Street
62W.W. Bratton, “Berle and Means Reconsidered at the Century’s Turn” (2001) 26 Journal of Corporate Law 737, 761.
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66A.D. Chandler, The Visible Hand: The Managerial Revolution in American Business (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1997), p.9.
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having the power to control large corporations whose
activities and now shareholder basis involved a large part
of the electorate.72 This therefore “led to legal constraints
which prohibited or raised the costs of banks and other
institutions holding large blocks of shares”.73 The
prohibition of bank ownership of equity promoted by the
Glass-Steagall Act 1933 was indicative of an ideological
and political climate that viewed the absence of
institutional investors as a prerequisite of corporate
democratisation. In any case, Roe suggested that the early
structures of American corporations created a path
dependency74; on the basis of the latter, this very initial
ownership structure had a significant influence on legal
rules, which also determined subsequent structures. The
law can contribute to the maintenance of a dispersed
shareholding basis by introducing high standards of
minority shareholder protection. Coffee argued75 that the
latter enjoy such a high level of protection that they lack
the incentive to advance their position within the
company, assuming additional risks. The advanced level
of legal protection they enjoy functions as a motivation
to sustain their current status and, hence, perpetuates the
fragmented shareholding of the corporation in question.
The corporate reality changed for good; ownership and
control were two concepts in a state of divorce.
Nowadays shareholders are not the
owners of the company
This article argues that the widely accepted and
vigorously supported view in the UK that the shareholders
are the exclusive owners of the corporation is simply
incorrect. An individual holding a property right on an
object is in a position to control it. The ability to control
what you own forms the core of property rights. The
owner of an object or property is in a position to control
its possession and define its use. The owner of property
can allow or prohibit access to it and can exercise the full
rights of ownership on his possession. The sole right
possessed by the owner of an asset is his ability to exclude
others from the use of that asset. That is, the owner of a
machine can decide who can and who cannot work on
that machine; the owner of a building can decide who can
and who cannot enter the building; the owner of the car
can decide who can drive it and who cannot enter it.76
Ownership emphasises physical possession; therefore, it
is a right which presents a certain degree of challenge
when attempting to apply it at corporate level.77 No
property right is absolute: as Parkinson points out,
ownership rights are not absolute.78 One explicit and
particularly important role which ownership of private
property plays is protecting owners against arbitrary
interference by allowing them to control and prevent
interference external to their property.79 Shareholders are
clearly not in a position to do that, especially since
interference with what supposedly constitutes their
property is institutionalised in the shape of management,
which they cannot usually control. The term “primacy”
entails supremacy or some sort of priority control over a
certain variable80; theoretically at least, shareholders
should enjoy that over the decision-making process.
However, that control is effectively granted to
management, with the shareholders lacking the
willingness, the information and the means to control it
to a degree that an owner would. The notion of ownership
may have been justified in the context of partnerships as
analysed above, where partners had equitable ownership
of the assets, acted as the management of the entity and
became insolvent with it. However, with the evolution of
the company into its current form, the nature of the role
of the shareholder has significantly changed. It is truly
astonishing that this is “seemingly forgotten by most
advocates of the finance model”.81 A major issue that
Berle and Means originally raised was whether
shareholders in widely held companies should be given
the same legal rights and protections as other owners of
property. Their answer was negative. It was clear that
ownership in this context is a very different concept from
the mainstream one we are all accustomed to. Therefore,
it is clear that the separation of equity ownership from
control radically altered the nature of the whole legal
concept of property in respect of corporations.82 The
separation of ownership and control left shareholders with
nothingmore than a symbolic sense of ownership,83 rather
than ownership itself. In the Kaufman84 case, the court
stated that a shareholder
“has no present interest in the physical property of
an unliquidated corporation; the corporation is
responsible for the acts of the corporation but the
stockholder normally is not… shareholders’ claims
have nothing to do with corporate assets [since]
corporate assets grow or diminish because of
corporate not shareholder conduct”.
72 See Roe, “A Political Theory of American Corporate Finance” (1991) 91 Columbia Law Review 10.
73Pettet’s Company Law: Company Law and Corporate Finance, edited by J. Lowry and A. Reisberg (Harlow: Pearson, 2012), p.66.
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80C. Nyombi, T. Mortimer and R. Lewis, “Shareholder Primacy and Stakeholders’ Interests in the Aftermath of a Takeover: A Review of Empirical Evidence” (2015) 2
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This makes it clear that any claim of ownership of the
company is simply impossible to sustain on legal
principles. In Short,85 the court stated that “shareholders
are not in the eyes of the law part owners of the
undertaking. The undertaking is something different from
the totality of its shareholding”.
In the company context, the shareholder does not own
specific assets of the corporation but rather a proportional
slice of the entirety of assets reflected in his stock
certificate. Shareholders hold no right over the tangible
and intangible assets of the company, otherwise the
personal creditors of the shareholders would be able to
seize the company’s assets in the case of default on their
debts.86 From a legal point of view, it is clear that the
shareholders do not own the company as none of the
requirements of ownership is met at this point.87 The
shareholders own shares, which are, in any case, items
of property per se.88 This does not in itself provide them
with a claim on the company’s assets, let alone entail the
ownership of the company as an entity.89 The rights in
the company arise as a result of the ownership of the share
and they are limited to those rights inherent in their
shares; there is no “residual claim to the company itself
… because the shareholders’ entitlement is then
exhausted”.90 Therefore, shareholders have evolved from
owners of the partnership into the bearers of rights
flowing directly from their shares. Rights embodied in
their shares are indicative of their ownership of the shares;
however, their status within the company is no longer
that of its owner. They own the capital reflected by the
value of their share. Our
“daily references to property tend to be a mutual
conspiracy of unsophisticated semantic allusions
and confusions … because our linguistic shorthand
has a certain low level communicative efficiency”.91
We use the term “owner” as “a convenient way of
referring to all kinds of claims to a resource without
thereby intending to delve into the precise nature of those
claims”.92 In company law, this problem emerges when
employing the term “ownership” in a rather imprecise
manner, referring to the company and not simply to the
share capital, as is correct.93 Therefore, the main point is
that the ownership of capital and of the actual shares
should not be confused with ownership of the firm.94 This
is the main mistake that has been carried on from the past
and into an era whose realities have rendered the previous
axioms obsolete. This is reflected by the fact that, in
public companies, most owners of the capital are almost
entirely dissociated from the management, with the result
that the agenda of the latter diverges from that of the
shareholders.95 In any case, it is clear and universally
accepted that when a shareholder invests money in a
company, the money becomes the equity of the
company96: “[p]roperty, power and entitlement can be
seen as the three central aspects of a share”,97 and the
share offers a bundle of rights that include neither the
ownership of the company’s assets nor the ownership of
the company as an entity. The rights that shareholders
have are simply the rights to receive a dividend, the right
to vote and the right to bring derivative proceedings on
behalf of the company; the latter is analysed in the final
part of this article. These rights flow from their ownership
of the share and not from owning the company.98
However, even this assumption is no longer adequate
in the current economic and financial reality.
Developments in capital markets have facilitated the
decoupling of the ownership of shares from voting rights,
and have consequently fundamentally undermined the
understanding that underlines the position of shareholders
in the company. We can now have shareholders with no
voting rights or shareholders with limited voting rights,
which sheds light on the democratic deficit99 within the
corporate context. From the erosion of the one share, one
vote system we passed to the removal of voting rights
altogether in certain cases, which is an astonishing
downgrading of the position of shareholders within the
corporate context. In such a context, it is clear that the
shareholders face mounting challenges to enforce rights
that stem from their ownership of the shares, let alone
sustain any legally unfounded notion of ownership of the
company as an entity.
This is of paramount importance because shareholder
control of the company in the UK or in the US as a
component of the alleged ownership works through the
mechanism of voting. Nowadays, the one share, one vote
rule may be a default rule of company law but it can be
removed by private contract, so ownership control by
shareholders can be eroded to non-existence.100 The
companies issue shares of various classes, which means
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that the multi-voting rights shares entail a multi-speed
share ownership too. When Google went public in 2014,
it
“issued class A shares with one vote each and class
B shares with ten votes each. The class B shares
were only available to founders the current
management team… their 33 per cent shareholding
gave the founders … 80 per cent of the votes”.101
Some shareholders are more privileged and equal than
others. Joint stock companies issued only one class of
shares, hence providing a basis for the justification of
shareholder primacy that entailed control of the
corporation and participation to its management.
Nowadays, the “owners” of the company may not
participate in the management, have limited information
about corporate affairs and have limited voting rights
which are inferior to their shareholding.
Modern investing techniques have further eroded the
relationship between the shareholder and the company.
It is now possible to acquire voting rights in the company
without owning stock.102 This is the practice of “stock
borrowing”, which is a system in which traders borrow
shares that they do not already own. It means that a hedge
fund can use the share’s voting rights without indeed
being its owner. This indicates not just how far this is
from the original concept of the joint stock companies,
but also the complete break from the reality of that era,
which, however, is dominant at a theoretical level even
today.103 This is particularly crucial because it underlines
how outdated are the principles which form the core of
the property rights rhetoric within the context of company
law. Modern financial practices have rendered obsolete
the argument that shareholders are the owners of the
company because, crucially, enough non-members can
use the voting rights that a share entails even though they
do not own the share. We have a massive antithesis at the
foundation of the argument in question: on the one hand,
the members of the company cannot exercise any voting
rights because they may possess shares with no voting
rights, but they are guaranteed compete supremacywithin
the corporate context. At the same time, non-members
can exercise voting rights flowing from shares that they
do not even own. The latter can exercise one among the
basic bundle of rights which is not available even to some
of the shareholders. This demonstrates the fallacy of
adopting a dogmatic view on shareholders’ exclusivity
based on an alleged ownership of the company. Also,
whilst company law is usually quick to adapt to the new
realities at both an economic and a societal level, it is
turning a blind eye to this misconception standing at its
foundations. This creates challenges to the agency rhetoric
too. The supporters of the nexus of contacts theory uphold
the view that the directors are the agents of the
shareholders, while they are clearly the agents of the
company. In the aforementioned case, are they also agents
of the hedge funds who borrowed the stocks while not
owning them or not? Do they form part of the body of
shareholders as, typically, they do not hold any shares,
although they do exercise the rights flowing from the
borrowed stocks, in sharp contrast to that part of the
shareholders who are not in a position to do so?
There is no dictionary in which this state of affairs
could be defined as “ownership” exercised by a holder
of a “property right”. This is why this article argues that
the contemporary corporate realities render a redefinition
of those terms in the company law context imperative. It
also argues that the current state of affairs is the byproduct
of a dominant ideology rather than the effect of law.
However, corporate practice is irreconcilable with
ideology104 as shareholders do not own anything in the
company other than shares, with the rights to vote and to
receive a dividend facing challenges when enforcement
is attempted. When they vote on corporate matters, they
vote in the shareholders’ meetings with an agenda fixed
by directors and on resolutions proposed by the
management. It is the board that decides what choices
are available for shareholders. The law of shareholder
voting is so weak that shareholders “scarcely qualify as
part of corporate governance … the list of items about
which shareholders have voting rights is remarkably
short”.105 The list includes, principally, the right to elect
and remove directors; they cannot vote to sell the
company’s assets or the company itself, although they
may in some cases vote to veto a sale or a merger
proposed by the board.106 In addition to that, in contrast
to the traditional legal theory of property rights, the
shareholders are not in a position to exercise the
traditional rights inherent in the concept of property; no
shareholder is permitted to use a listed company’s assets
for his own purpose or to restrict management’s access
to corporate resources.107 Instead, the shareholder only
acquires the right to dividends which, in any case, fall
within the absolute discretion of the management and a
very limited right of control.108 The concrete definition of
the rights of a proprietary nature stemming from the
ownership of shares is indeed problematic, considering
that the shareholders do not have a right to receive a fixed
dividend or to have their capital returned to them at a
specified date. The difficulty in defining the exact scope
of the proprietary rights stemming from stockholding is
reflective of the challenges in defining shareholding in a
traditional “property right” sense. The corporate concept
slices the bundle of rights inherent in property into various
101C. Padgett, Corporate Governance (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), p.19.
102B. Tricker, Corporate Governance (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012), p.59.
103Tricker, Corporate Governance (2012), p.59.
104 I. Kerekebuna, “Shareholders as Owners of the Corporation: Why Should We Care?” (2013) 18(2) Coventry Law Journal 19, 21.
105 J.R. Macey, Corporate Governance (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2008), p.201.
106L. Stout, “New Thinking on Shareholder Primacy” in P.M. Vasudev and Susan Watson (eds), Corporate Governance after the Financial Crisis (Cheltenham: Edward
Elgar 2012), p.28.
107Rose, “Stakeholder Orientation versus Shareholder Value” (2004) 18 European Journal of Law and Economics 77, 82.
108Votaw, Modern Corporations (1965), pp.96–97.
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pieces; however, the rights to possess, use and control
the property are clearly attributed to the management of
the corporation.109 Thus, only the right to transfer the
interest, which has also been the overriding aim in the
securities markets, is undoubtedly exercised by the
shareholders.110According to the court, “a sole shareholder
has no independent right which is violated by trespass
upon or conversion of the corporation’s property”.111 This
is an astonishing ruling that demonstrates the difficulty
of using traditional notions of property in the corporate
context. Therefore, when property rights have been
deprived of all their essential elements, attempting to
identify one party as the “owner” in the traditional sense
is neither meaningful nor right.112
Especially the latter two items involve the management
of property, which is the core right inherent in ownership.
The fact that shareholders do not have a say on that is
clearly indicative of the non-existence of any sort of
property rights over the company. When the lack of
control is accompanied by apathy towards the company
and abstinence from its decision-making, then the
involvement of shareholders within the decision-making
of the company becomes purely ceremonial, if not a mere
farce. It is therefore clear that shareholder primacy is
based on a deeply outmoded conception of the company.113
It appears that the exercise of control on the part of the
shareholders over the management would mostly depend
on the size of their shareholding; majority shareholders
may assume initiatives that would be similar to that of an
owner. However, minority shareholders are most likely
to fail to exercise any of the powers that would normally
be exercised by an “owner”. The notion of shareholder
primacy, based on a hollow concept of ownership, is
undermined by the very realities that shareholders face
when attempting to participate in corporate life. It is
therefore imperative that the existing legal framework
sets aside its dominant ideological perceptions and
embraces an approach that would reflect the current state
of affairs more accurately. The concept of ownership is
no longer the “key doctrinal construct in explaining the
position and the rights of shareholders”.114
The judges, too, seemed to have moved away from
protecting the shareholders’ property rights in the
company to a focus on protecting their ownership of their
shares.115 There are “three elements to the concept of
private property, namely having an interest in an
enterprise, having power over it and acting with respect
to it”.116 Shareholders do have an interest in the enterprise
and so too do other stakeholders. The separation of
ownership and control has eroded the foundations of the
property right that the shareholders clearly held in
partnerships and joint stock companies. In this context,
sustaining a company model marked by absolute
shareholder supremacy is hard to justify, and so is its
dominance in theory and law.
Institutional investors who will normally hold a greater
piece of shareholding than ordinary shareholders do not
appear to be particularly empowered either. Despite the
concentration of shares in the hands of institutions,
shareholder accountability has not increased to the degree
predicted or hoped for at the beginning. Hence, the main
question is: why are institutional investors not using their
voting power to curb directors’ excessive pay?117 The lack
of motivation of institutional investors to play a crucial
role in the monitoring of management in many cases can
be explained by the fact that sometimes the investors in
question are located in jurisdictions different from the
domicile of the company whose shareholding they
acquired. They also take into account the transaction costs
involved in monitoring the management, which most
often exceed the gain from monitoring or are of equal
value.118 Therefore, they may not want to incur that cost.
The effect is that, although institutional investors are, by
definition, in a better position to control management,
they choose apathy, aligning their position with individual
shareholders. When interviewed about shareholders
exercising their rights, one institutional investor noted:
“[T]here is a weakness … in that responsibility for
ownership rests with people who don’t want it and
are not seeking it. We are investing in shares because
they give us a good return and it is coincidental
really that they bring with them this responsibility.
I am not saying we don’t want this responsibility. I
am saying it is difficult to handle that sort of
thing.”119
The body of shareholders is likely to remain rationally
apathetic.120 It is therefore clear that shareholder
democracy as a concept is now “fallacious”121 because
any idea of shareholder control as a counter to managerial
power has proved to be more wishful thinking rather than
reality. As Attenborough puts it, the traditional
109 See Blair, Ownership and Control (1995), p.224.
110Monks and Minow, Corporate Governance (2010), p.108.
111W. Clay Jackson Enterprises 463 F. Supp. 666, 670 (D.P.R. 1979).
112 See J.W. Singer, “The Reliance Interest in Property” (1988) 40 Stanford Law Review 611, 615.
113 S. Watson, “How the Company Became an Entity: A New Understanding of Corporate Law” [2015] J.B.L. 120.
114Grantham, “The Doctrinal Basis of the Rights of Company Shareholders” (1998) 57 Cambridge Law Journal 554, 556.
115 S. Leader, “Private Property and Corporate Governance Part I: Defining the Interests” in F. Patfield (ed.), Perspectives on Company Law (London: Kluwer Law
International, 1995), p.94.
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“enabling-law philosophy, excessively aggressive
efficiency rationales and powerfully focused
managerial strategies have combined to weaken an
already inarticulate faith in the primacy of owner
over manager”.122
Greenfield found the property-based conception of the
shareholders’ role to be “crude and analytically unsound
and a simplistic notion of the sanctity and the indivisibility
of property rights”123 since the shareholders lack control
over the corporate assets.
The shareholders tend to look at the company as a
means to make profit rather than an entity they ownwhich
they can use in the manner they see more fit.
Tocqueville’s central hypothesis was that “democracy
constitutes the sole model of acceptable governance in
modern society and it will eventually prevail in all spheres
of organised activity”124: corporations might prove even
Tocqueville wrong, at least in the sense of democracy as
we know it in the public domain. Despite that, English
company law embraces the dominant principle of
shareholder primacy, shareholder wealth maximisation
or shareholder value.125 However, even though
shareholders might be seen as the owners of the company
by the majority of scholars and legislators, this is not
always the case in the courts. InKaufman, the court stated
that “a shareholder has no present interest in the property
of a company that remained out of liquidation”.126 In
Short,127 Lord Justice Evershed of the English Court of
Appeal “denied the ownership of the company by
shareholders”.128 In Bligh,129 the court provided that
“shareholders have no proprietary interest in the
corporation”.130 In the Macaura case,131 the court stated
that
“the corporator even if he holds all the shares is not
the corporation, and that neither he nor any creditor
of the company has any property legal or equitable
in the assets of the corporation”.
Therefore, the basic principle that was clarified in the
landmark Salomon132 case comes into direct conflict with
the notion that shareholders are the owners of the
company. It is astonishing how two of the most important
features of English company law, the separate legal
personality granted to the company and shareholder
supremacy based on a notion of ownership, come into
conflict with each other in such an abrupt manner. The
dominant view, which therefore recognises that
shareholders have a property right over the company,
does not only conflict with contemporary reality as
analysed above, but is also directly in contrast with one
of the pillars of modern company law.
Can the shareholders exercise effective
control on management? The case of
the derivative action
The duties which a director owes to the company are
useful only if they can be enforced effectively. Therefore,
the question is: can the supposed owners of the company
exercise effective control over management? The analysis
embarks on the premise that, if a right has been infringed
which is, in law, a right belonging to a company, the only
proper claimant is the company itself. This rule was
known as the rule in Foss after the case in which it was
first clearly established. This is one of the most
fundamental rules in company law, which demonstrates
that the ownership of the company’s affairs rests with the
company. If one of its rights is infringed then it is for the
company as a separate legal entity to act. Individual
shareholders are given that right only as an exception to
the rule. That comes into contrast with the notion of
property rights out of the context of company law. If one’s
right to one’s property is infringed, then the property
owner will be in a position to exercise any right to protect
the property. The fact that one of the most integral
elements of property rights is not available to
shareholders, apart from as an exception to the rule,
demonstrates the lack of solid foundations for any
property rights rhetoric within the ambit of company law.
In Bamford, it was stated that it “would be for the
company to decide whether to institute proceedings to
avoid the voidable allotment”.133 Therefore, as a basic
principle of company law, the institution of proceedings
against the perpetrator of a wrong against the company
rests with the company. That leaves especially the
minority shareholders in an incredibly disadvantageous
position. This principle was aimed at avoiding the
problem of proceedings being commenced simultaneously
by all the shareholders who believed themselves to be
aggrieved by a particular action of the management.
Therefore, it is evident that both the law and the courts
strove to protect the company as the entity which bears
those rights, and not the shareholders. The legal entity
that is the company is the owner of the company, and,
therefore, both the legislature and the judiciary created
the legislative and judicial framework which prevented
shareholders from raising their own claims against the
perceived perpetrators of the wrong against the company.
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If there was an ownership right infringed, this clearly
belonged to the legal person. The shareholders could put
forward any claims that they potentially had only through
an exception to the rule—the so-called derivative claim.
A shareholder might be permitted to sue on behalf of the
company if the latter’s board is dominated by the
perpetrators of the wrong who prevent the company from
suing them. Therefore, the aggrieved shareholders are
seeking to enforce a right which does not belong to them
but to the company; the right derives from the company.
The court introduces a set of onerous requirements that
the shareholders in question will need to satisfy before
their claim is even examined by the court. If the
shareholders manage to satisfy these tough requirements,
then they receive compensation for their losses which,
however, has to be returned to the company since they
exercise a right which does not belong to them but to the
company. Therefore, it is clear that the company has
simply outsourced a right to the aggrieved shareholder
which did not belong to him, simply because, owing to
the circumstances, the company could not exercise that
right at the moment and it would have been in the interests
of the company that the shareholder should be allowed to
exercise that right as an exception to the rule. Therefore,
the very nature of the derivative action negates the very
essence of the claim that the shareholders have a property
right over the company. If they did, they would have been
able to exercise all the rights integral to a property right,
such as the right to protect their property from abuse.
Minority shareholders
In addition to that, the Foss rule consolidated a concept
of majority rule134 in the company’s affairs. This leaves
minority shareholders with few chances to safeguard their
right, which exposes the judicial reluctance to uphold the
right of action of minorities. In the case of individuals
who own property, they have the equal capacity to
exercise all rights stemming from their ownership against
any perpetrator; however, this is not the case with
shareholders. The minority ones will find that raising a
derivative action is indeed very difficult. So, within the
company context, it is indeed very problematic to go
down the property rights road without encountering
insurmountable obstacles. Section 261 of the CA 2006
lays down the procedure to be followed when raising a
derivative claim and sets out the rules for the derivative
claim to proceed. The member of the company who is
bringing the derivative claim must apply to the court for
permission to continue it. This is a reflection of the Foss
rule and two of its most important principles: the
principles of “proper plaintiff” and the principle of
“internal management”. The latter is clearly reflective of
the majority rule; the courts will refrain from intervening
in the internal decision-making of the company unless it
is deemed absolutely necessary.135
Therefore, the historical position of the country towards
the protection of minority shareholders has been criticised
as a harsh stance.136 Sealy has described the English courts
as hostile to minority shareholder litigations.137 This
highlights the astonishing contradiction between theory
and judicial practice, with the former recognising the
shareholders as the owners of the company and the latter
refraining from granting them the right to uninhibitedly
protect their interests over what they allegedly own. The
court will not intervene if it is of the opinion that pursuing
the perpetrator of the wrong done to the company is not
in the company’s interests, irrespective of whether the
interests of its shareholders were abused or not. While
scholars and practitioners debate several aspects of the
company, there is a widespread agreement that the
derivative action under English law does not constitute
an effective controllingmechanism.138This seems to imply
that it is “somehow undesirable that companies are
exposed to civil litigation by minority shareholders”.139
Therefore, it seems that the effectiveness of shareholders
remedies is inhibited by an implicit need to limit
shareholders’ access to litigation. The company apparently
needs to be protected by a flood of lawsuits from
aggrieved shareholders. This is, however, indicative of
the status of power within the company too. The principal
role rests with the legal person that is the company. To
put it simply, it is the legal person which clearly owns
the company. The shareholders have a rather problematic
access to a set of remedies that do not justify any notion
of an alleged ownership. The subject matter of protection
is clearly the company, and not them. In the UK, the
ability of shareholders to litigate against directors is so
reduced that the most effective means of directorial
control in public companies is to resort to the market of
corporate control, namely to expect a takeover which will
result in the removal of the current management. This
means that shareholders view an external form of
management control as more effective than an internal
one, which is an astonishing feature of a jurisdiction based
on a notion of shareholder ownership of the company.
Procedure for bringing a derivative claim
The court will determine whether it is going to allow the
derivative claim to proceed in accordance with the criteria
laid down in s.263 of the CA 2006. Section 261(2)
clarifies that, during the first stage of the application, the
court is interested mainly in the evidence provided by the
applicant to help it decide whether a prima facie case is
established; if it is, the court will grant permission to
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proceed. This is a unique requirement as it does not
normally exist in civil cases. Basically, the court will
examine, on a prima facie basis, whether the criteria of
s.263 are fulfilled so as to allow the case to proceed.
During the second stage of the procedure, s.261(3)
clarifies that the court can give further directions as to
the evidence to be provided, this time by the company.
The third stage of the process includes the hearing,
provided for by s.261(4). If the court is convinced that
the criteria of s.263 are met, it may give permission to
continue with the claim. The obligation to establish a
prima facie case before the examination of the actual
claim was not part of the Law Commission’s
recommendations; however, it was introduced by the
Parliament in order to discourage shareholders from
initiating proceedings against their management in big
numbers.
Section 263(2) sets out the requirements which, if
fulfilled, will grant the permission to continue the
derivative claim. Section 263(2)(a) introduces a hurdle
for a minority shareholder to clear. The question to be
asked here would be: would a—fictional—director acting
under his duty to promote the success of the company
(s.172) raise a derivative claim? The court must assess
whether the derivative claim will contribute to the
promotion of the success of the company or not. The
actual effect of this provision is to grant to the court
management powers140 as to the determination of whether
proceeding may be brought against a wrong. The duty of
s.172 applies exclusively to directors who are appointed
to the office with the duty to promote the success of the
company as a whole. The directors cannot pursue—at
least theoretically—their own interests but they have to
pursue the interests of the company. In contrast to that,
shareholders are indeed in a position to pursue their own
selfish interests,141 as well as their personal agenda, since
they do not act as the agents of the company’s interests.
Therefore, basically, here we witness the imposition on
the shareholders of a duty that is imposed on directors.
This is an emphatic reminder of the fact that the
ownership of the company rests with the company. The
company is the overwhelming authority against which
the court is to determine which action can be pursued and
which action should be swallowed by the aggrieved
shareholder. The latter may theoretically be the owner of
the company but, in practice, both the law and the courts
are clearly setting his/her interests aside so as to safeguard
the real owner of the company; namely, the legal person
that is the company.
In Franbar Holdings,142 the court explained some of
the matters that a fictional director may consider, such as
the size of the claim, the cost of proceedings, the ability
of the company to fund them, the effect on the company’s
reputation and the disruption to its normal business
activities. In the same case, the deputy judge accepted
that, where an unfair prejudice claim under s.994 has been
instituted143 and the claimant is offered to be bought out
of the company, then a hypothetical director acting under
the s.172 obligation would be less likely to continue the
derivative claim. Despite the fact that both remedies can
be exercised for the very same real facts, it seems that,
in fact, if that happens, then s.994 will indeed undermine
the solidity of the case for the application of s.260. That
sends the message that the derivative action is a
second-class remedy. In Iesini,144 the court also stated that
it should only refuse permission when no director145would
seek to continue the claim. Although this sounds as if it
is extending the ambit of protection granted by the courts,
it is not compatible with the letter of the provision, which
does not imply such a test. Furthermore, it always remains
to be seen whether this test will be complied with in the
future by the courts or whether it will suffer changes to
the direction of its limitation. In the same case, the court
held that, if the claim is for the benefit of the company,
it will be allowed even if the claimant will derive other
benefits from it. If the dominant purpose of the action is
for the benefit of the company, then it will satisfy the
good faith requirement. In Mission Capital,146 the court
stated that permission to continue with a derivative claim
on the basis of s.261 was refused where the fictional
director acting on the basis of s.172 was unlikely to attach
much importance to the claim in question and the alleged
damage was speculative.
In accordance with s.263(2)(b) and (c), if the alleged
wrong has been either authorised or ratified by the
company, then permission to continue will not be given.
This places a considerable burden on the shoulders of
minority shareholders. This is a clear expression both of
the “appropriate plaintiff” principle as well as the
“majority rule”. The appropriate plaintiff is always the
company and, if it decides to ratify a wrong done to it,
then the aggrieved shareholder will not be allowed to
proceed with his claim against the perpetrator. This means
that the alleged “owner” of the companywill be prevented
from suing against an abuse of his alleged “property right”
because the judicial authorities will no longer recognise
such a right as belonging to him. This is because the
actual owner of such a right—the company—has indeed
decided that pursuing the claim is not in its interests. The
only relief that the law offered to minority shareholders
is the new s.239 of the CA 2006, which now provides
that the votes of the wrongdoing directors and connected
members will be disregarded in ratifying the wrongdoing
conduct. This may relieve some shareholders and
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somehow help to reverse the trend which witnessed only
a few cases of shareholders initiating derivative actions
in England.147
Section 263(4) provides that “particular regard” should
be given to the views of those members who have no
personal interest in the case. Smith v Croft had previously
introduced the requirement that, in order for a derivative
action to proceed, the minority shareholder in question
had to prove that he enjoyed the support of the majority
of independent-minded shareholders. That is a reference
to the majority of the shareholders independent from the
directors; otherwise one might say that, in order for the
aggrieved shareholder to have locus standi, he needs to
be supported by themajority of the minority shareholders.
This is particularly difficult in small or medium-sized
private limited companies, where normally the
shareholders will share close personal links with each
other—sometimes they may even be family—and they
are quite probably going to be unwilling to jeopardise
those links by supporting a derivative action. This is
clearly further undermining the raising of a derivative
action. In Stainer,148 the court stated that the applicant
commenced the proceedings not only in his own interests
but for the benefit of a large number of minority
shareholders. He secured letters of support and a financial
contribution from 35 other small shareholders. The
applicant’s conduct in seeking and obtaining that support
was perceived by the court as strong evidence that he was
acting in good faith. It is therefore evident that a
shareholder who wishes to bring a derivative action has
to deal with challenging procedural and substantive
obstacles149 so as to be granted permission to proceed with
his action. This is despite the fact that the CA 2006 has
actually removed a few of the pre-existing obstacles
which were introduced previously by the courts and are
no longer in place, such as the obligation to prove that
the wrongdoer had profited personally from his own
negligence.150
Conclusion
This article has argued against the dominant view in both
academia and practice that shareholders are the owners
of the company. It has explained that the concept of
ownership of the company on the part of the shareholders
is simply a fallacy; therefore, the edifice of shareholder
supremacy is based on shaky foundations and it should
be reformed. The nature and the subject matter of property
rights as we know them outside company law do not
operate on the same basis within company law. The
company as a legal person has disassociated itself from
the humans behind it, and the complex relationshipswhich
have evolved within the corporate framework have led
to a corporate landscape where shareholders are in no
position to control the company in a variety of important
matters inherent in its function. If the purpose of
recognising shareholder ownership over the company
was to empower shareholders and to attain a greater level
of protection of their rights, then this has clearly failed.
This is because nowadays, in practice, shareholder
supremacy has given way to managerial dominance. The
latter has shifted the focus of the company to short-term
goals which are not only detrimental for the company as
a whole but also for the shareholders more specifically.
The courts, which in principle are fervent supporters of
shareholder supremacy, have effectively curtailed
shareholders’ rights to an unacceptable degree, as the
case of the application of shareholders’ remedies
demonstrates. It is therefore evident that shareholder
supremacy is nowadays purely ideological and a relic of
previous corporate forms that are now extinct. A degree
of dogmatic adherence to ideologies which were rendered
obsolete by reality created a problematic situation within
company law, which has the company and its shareholders
as one of the main victims. Legislators should set aside
any ideological dogmatism and reform the law so as to
address these issues and adjust to the realities and the
challenges of the 21st century, while playing their societal
role effectively. The latter involves a company with a
long-term agenda. It involves a company that will
effectively safeguard the interests of its shareholders
against managerial abuse and be inclusive of the
stakeholders who are instrumental in its success,
especially the creditors and the employees. In an era of
globalisation and increased corporate presence in all
aspects of life, this is a goal that needs to be achieved.
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